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Politics	of	(In)visibility:	
Governance-Resistance	and	the	Constitution	of	Refugee	Subjectivities	in	Malaysia1	
Leonie	Ansems	de	Vries,	King’s	College	London		
To	be	published	in	Review	of	International	Studies	(forthcoming)	
Abstract	
This	article	explores	the	relationality	of	governance	and	resistance	in	the	context	of	the	
constitution	of	refugee	subjectivities	in	Malaysia.	Whilst	recognising	their	precarity,	the	article	moves	
away	from	conceiving	of	refugees	merely	as	victims	subjected	to	violence	and	control,	and	to	
contribute	to	an	emerging	body	of	literature	on	migrant	resistance.	Its	contribution	lies	in	examining	
practices	of	resistance,	and	the	specific	context	in	which	they	emerge,	without	conceptualising	
power-resistance	as	a	binary,	and	without	conceiving	of	refugees	as	pre-constituted	subjects.	Rather,	
drawing	on	the	thought	of	Michel	Foucault,	the	article	examines	how	refugee	subjectivities	come	
into	being	through	a	play	of	governance-resistance,	of	practices	and	strategies	that	may	be	
simultaneously	affirmative,	subversive,	exclusionary	and	oppressive.	The	relationality	and	mobility	of	
this	play	is	illustrated	through	an	examination	of	practices	surrounding	UNHCR	identity	cards,	
community	organisations	and	education.	Secondly,	governance-resistance	is	conceptualised	as	a	play	
of	visibility	and	invisibility,	understood	both	visually	and	in	terms	of	knowledge	production.	What	I	
refer	to	as	the	politics	of	(in)visibility	indicates	that	refugee	subjectivities	are	both	constituted	and	
become	other	than	“the	refugee”	through	a	continuous	play	of	coming	into	being,	becoming	
governable,	claiming	a	presence,	blending	in	and	remaining	invisible.				
Keywords	
refugees,	resistance,	(in)visibility,	governance,	politics,	subjectivity			
Introduction	
This	article	explores	the	complex	relationality	of	practices	of	governance	and	resistance	in	the	
context	of	the	constitution	of	refugee	subjectivities	in	Malaysia.	What	I	refer	to	as	the	politics	of	
(in)visibility	indicates	that	“refugees”	are	neither	merely	victims,	subjected	to	violence	and	control,	
nor	simply	agents	of	resistance.	Something	more	complex	is	at	play,	which	pushes	beyond	the	binary	
of	governance	versus	resistance.	By	examining	the	relationality	of	these	practices	as	well	as	the	
																																																								
1	I	would	like	to	thank	the	audiences	at	the	following	research	seminars	and	workshops	for	their	helpful	
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specific	context	in	and	through	which	they	emerge,	the	article	offers	a	contribution	to	the	emerging	
body	of	literature	on	migrant	activism	and	resistance.		
At	first	sight,	precarity	may	appear	to	be	the	most	fitting	term	for	the	situation	of	irregular	
migrants	in	Malaysia.	According	to	Malaysian	law,	one	is	either	a	legal	migrant	or	an	illegal	migrant,	
and	the	government’s	approach	to	“illegal	migrants”	is	characterised	by	raids,	arrest,	detention	and	
corporal	punishment.2	There	is	no	distinction	between	migrants	and	refugees	in	Malaysian	law,	that	
is	to	say	the	category	of	the	refugee	does	not	exist.	Without	a	legal	status,	the	possibilities	of	
claiming	an	affirmative	identity	in	resistance	to	the	violence	of	the	state	may	seem	limited.	This	
absence	of	the	category	of	the	refugee	differs	from	the	currently	prevailing	conceptualisation	of	
refugees	in	terms	of	crisis	and	emergency	by	governments,	humanitarian	organisations	and	scholars	
alike,	as	a	result	of	which	refugees	are	regarded	as	a	(technical)	problem	to	be	resolved.3	Refugees	
do	exist,	yet	they	constitute	an	abnormality	characterised	by	a	situation	of	emergency.	What	these	
approaches	share,	however,	is	that	refugees	are	negatively	defined	and	denied	political	subjectivity.		
Rather	than	conceptualising	refugees	in	terms	of	‘speechlessness,	placelessnes,	invisibility,	
victim	status’4,	this	article	draws	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	refugees	pursue	affirmative	political	
practices	in	difficult	circumstances,	or	rather,	how	refugee	subjectivities	come	into	being	through	
practices	of	governance	and	resistance.	This	approach	draws	on	a	body	of	research	that	highlights	
the	political	character	of	migrant	activism	and	resistance	through	notions	such	as	‘agency’,	
‘autonomy	of	migration’,	‘irregularity’	and	‘ambivalence’.5	Much	of	this	research	either	highlights	the																																																									
2	Jeff	Crisp,	Naoko	Obi	and	Liz	Umlas,	But	when	will	our	turn	come?	A	review	of	the	implementation	of	
UNHCR’s	urban	refugee	policy	in	Malaysia	(Geneva:	United	National	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees,	Policy	
Development	and	Evaluation	Service,	2012),	p.	1.		
3	Peter	Nyers,	Rethinking	Refugees.	Beyond	States	of	Emergency	(New	York:	Routledge,	2006),	p.	6.	See	also:	
Liisa	Malkki,	Purity	and	Exile:	Violence,	Memory	and	National	Cosmology	among	Hutu	Refugees	in	Tanzania	
(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1995),	p.	8.			
4	Nyers	‘Rethinking	Refugees’,	p.	45.		
5	E.g.	Claudia	Aradau,	Jef	Huysmans	and	Vicky	Squire,	‘Acts	of	European	Citizenship:	A	Political	Sociology	of	
Mobility’,	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies	48:4	(2010),	pp.	945-65;	Jonathan	Darling	and	Vicky	Squire,	‘The	
“Minor”	Politics	of	Rightful	Presence:	Justice	and	Relationality	in	City	of	Sanctuary’,	International	Political	
Sociology,	7	(2013),	pp.		59-74;	Engin	Isin	and	Greg	Nielsen	(eds.),	Acts	of	Citizenship	(London	and	New	York:	
Zed	Books,	2008);	Heather	Johnson,	‘The	Other	Side	of	the	Fence:	Reconceptualizing	the	“Camp”	and	Migration	
Zones	at	the	Borders	of	Spain’,	International	Political	Sociology,	7	(2013),	pp.	75-91;	Malkki,	‘Purity	and	exile’;	
Anne	McNevin,	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship:	Theorising	the	Political	Claims	of	Irregular	Migrants’,	Millennium:	
Journal	of	International	Studies,	41:2	(2013),	pp.	182-200;	Sandro	Mezzadra,	‘The	Right	to	Escape’,	Ephemera,	
4:3	(2004),	pp.	267-75;	Sandro	Mezzadra	and	Brett	Neilson,	‘Né	qui,	né	altrove—	Migration,	Detention,	
Desertion:	A	Dialogue’,	Borderlands	Ejournal,	2:1	(2003);	Carolina	Moulin	and	Peter	Nyers,	‘‘‘We	Live	in	a	
Country	of	UNHCR’’—Refugee	Protests	and	Global	Political	Society’,	International	Political	Sociology	1:4	(2007);	
	Peter	Nyers,	‘Abject	Cosmopolitanism:	The	Politics	of	Protection	in	the	Anti-Deportation	Movement’,	Third	
World	Quarterly,	24:6	(2003),	pp.	1069-1093;	Nyers,	‘Rethinking	refugees’;	D.	Papadopolous,	N.	Stephenson,	
and	V.	Tsianos,	Escape	routes:	control	and	subversion	in	the	twenty	first	century	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2008);	
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agency	of	migrants,	or	posits	a	more	or	less	binary	relationship	between	mobility	and	control,	that	is	
to	say	the	migrants’	ability	to	move	and	act	politically	versus	the	state’s	securitising	practices	which	
suppress	migrants’	claims	to	(political)	existence,	although	a	number	of	scholars	move	away	from	
such	binary	thinking.6			
The	contribution	of	this	article	lies,	firstly,	in	exploring	the	complexity	and	relationality	of	
practices	of	governance	and	resistance	as	constitutive	of	refugee	subjectivities	–	moving	away	from	a	
conception	of	power-resistance	as	a	binary	relationship	as	well	as	from	the	conception	of	refugees	as	
pre-constituted	subjects	(of	control	or	resistance).	Informed	by	the	thought	of	Michel	Foucault,	the	
focus	is	on	the	play	of	power	and	resistance	whereby	both	are	produced	by	and	productive	of	a	
multiple	field	of	forces.7	Taking	seriously	the	idea	of	a	play	of	force-relations,	the	focus	is	on	the	
movements	in-between	governance	and	resistance,	that	is	practices	that	function	as	governance	and	
resistance	simultaneously:	governance-resistance.	
Moreover,	and	this	is	the	second	contribution	of	the	article,	it	is	a	play	productive	both	of	
subjectivities	and	knowledges,	and	the	specific	environment	in	which	these	emerge.	Unlike	much	of	
the	research	on	migrant	activism,	which	is	set	in	a	Western	context,	this	article	addresses	the	
situation	in	a	non-Western	state	that	has	not	signed	the	1951	Refugee	Convention	and	its	1967	
Protocol	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees.	This	has	considerable	implications,	for	instance,	with	
																																																																																																																																																																													
Eeva	Puumula,	‘Political	life	beyond	accommodation	and	return:	rethinking	relations	between	the	political,	the	
international	and	the	body’,	Review	of	International	Studies,	39:	4	(2013),	pp.	949-968;	Kim	Rygiel,	‘Bordering	
solidarities:	migrant	activism	and	the	politics	of	movement	and	camps	at	Calais’,	Citizenship	Studies,	15:1	
(2011),	pp.	1-19;	Vicky	Squire	(ed.),	The	Contested	Politics	of	Mobility:	Borderzones	and	Irregularity	(New	York:	
Routledge,	2011);	Stephan	Scheel,	‘Autonomy	of	Migration	Despite	Its	Securitisation?	Facing	the	Terms	and	
Conditions	of	Biometric	Bordering’,	Millennium:	Journal	of	International	Studies,	41:3	(2013),	pp.	1-26;	Stephan	
Scheel	and	Philipp	Ratfisch,	‘Refugee	Protection	Meets	Migration	Management:	UNHCR	as	a	Global	Police	of	
Populations’,	Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies	40:6	(2014);	Maurice	Stierl,	‘“No	One	Is	Illegal!”	
Resistance	and	the	Politics	of	Discomfort’,	Globalisations,	9:3	(2012),	pp.	425-38;	Martina	Tazzioli,	Spaces	of	
Governmentality:	Autonomous	Migration	and	the	Arab	Uprisings	(London	and	New	York:	Rowman	and	
Littlefield	International,	2015);	Martina	Tazzioli	and	William	Walters,	‘The	Sight	of	Migration:	Governmentality,	
Visibility,	and	Europe's	Contested	Borders’,	Global	Society	(forthcoming)		
6	E.g.	McNevin	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’;	Puumula,	‘Political	life’;	Rygiel,	‘Bordering	solidarities’;	Squire,	
‘Contested	politics’.		
7	Michel	Foucault,	The	Will	to	Knowledge.	The	History	of	Sexuality:	An	Introduction,	transl.	Robert	Hurley,	
(London:	Penguin,	1990),	p.	329.	The	article	adopts	a	Foucaultian	approach	not	in	the	sense	of	employing	
Foucault	or	applying	his	concepts,	but	in	the	sense	of	developing	ideas	and	engaging	with	concepts	and	
practices	in	a	Foucaultian	manner	(see	e.g.	William	Walters,	‘Foucault	and	Frontiers:	Notes	on	the	birth	of	the	
humanitarian	border’	in	Ulrich	Bröckling,	Susanne	Krasmann	and	Thomas	Lemke	(eds.),	Governmentality:	
Current	Issues	and	Future	Challenges	(New	York:	Routledge,	2011),	p.		158).	Thus,	for	instance,	the	article	does	
not	seek	to	understand	what	power	or	resistance	means,	or	to	define	what	it	is,	because	concepts	have	no	
fixed	meaning	but	are	in	the	process	of	being	created	and	transformed.		
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regard	to	which	actors	are	involved	and	how	they	are	constituted	in	the	process,	as	well	as	in	relation	
to	the	potentialities	of	governance-resistance.8		
Conceptualising	how	subjectivities	come	into	being	poses	a	terminological	challenge.	If	
refugeeness	is	an	“effect”	of	certain	processes,	we	cannot	refer	to	this	term	from	the	start.	The	term	
migrant	will	therefore	be	employed	to	refer	to	non-Malaysian	citizens	in	general,	thus	seeking	to	
avoid	reproducing	the	problematic	distinction	between	‘refugees’	as	victims	in	need	of	protection	
and	‘economic’	or	‘illegal’	migrants	who	are	not.	The	term	‘irregular	migrant’	will	be	used	to	refer	to	
migrants	without	a	legal	status	under	Malaysia	law,	whilst	‘refugee’	is	used	to	express	their	coming	
into	being	as	refugees.	The	term	‘illegal	migrant’	is	used	when	referring	to	the	perspective	of	the	
government,	in	order	to	highlight	its	criminalisation	of	irregular	migrants.	That	is	to	say,	the	category	
of	the	‘illegal	migrant’	is,	like	the	category	of	the	‘refugee’,	not	an	essential	identity	but	a	condition	
that	has	been	produced	through	particular	practices.9		
The	argument	develops	as	follows.	The	first	section	examines	the	production	of	the	‘illegal	
migrant’	in	Malaysia	through	governmental	practices	of	securitisation	and	criminalisation.	The	
second	section	turns	to	the	coming	into	being	of	the	‘refugee’,	as	an	effect	of	practices	of	(UNHCR)	
governance.	Specifically,	it	discusses	the	UNHCR	identity	card,	which	migrants	receive	upon	
registration	with	the	organisation,	and	which	functions	as	a	device	of	freedom-security,	producing	a	
break	between	refugees	and	(‘illegal’/’economic’)	migrants.	By	contrast,	section	three	conceptualises	
the	identity	card	and	related	practices	as	a	play	of	governance-resistance,	and	discusses	the	material-
discursive	character	of	these	processes.	It	will	be	suggested	that	the	practices	and	strategies	at	play	
in	this	context	function	as	forms	of	affirmation,	subversion,	control,	management	and	exclusion	
simultaneously.	Sections	four	and	five	turn	to	the	notion	of	(in)visibility	as	a	visual	device	and	a	form	
of	knowledge	production	respectively.	The	focus	of	section	four	is	on	the	socio-political	space	in	
which	refugee	subjectivities	emerge,	especially	in	relation	to	education,	through	tactics	of	visibility	
and	invisibility.	Section	five	discusses	(in)visibility	in	terms	of	knowledge,	however,	the	point	is	not	
simply	that	irregular	migrants	become	governable	by	becoming	knowable.	Rather,	it	is	illustrated	
how	visibility	can	function	to	invisibilise	violence	and	exclusion,	and	how	it	can	be	appropriated	to	
render	subjectivities	visible	as	something	else	than	illegal	other	or	(passive)	victim.	It	will	be	argued	
that	the	play	of	governance-resistance	is	a	politics	of	(in)visibility	in	the	sense	that	refugee	
subjectivities	are	both	produced	and	become	other	than	“the	refugee”	through	a	continuous	play	of																																																									
8	The	article	is	based	on	fieldwork	undertaken	in	Kuala	Lumpur	between	2012-2013	–	I	lived	in	Malaysia	from	
2011-2013,	during	which	time	I	worked	at	the	University	of	Nottingham	Malaysia	Campus.	During	the	last	6	
months	of	this	period,	I	volunteered	for	the	UNHCR,	as	an	English	teacher	in	a	(Chin)	refugee	learning	centre.		
9	Cf.	Stephan	Scheel	and	Vicky	Squire,	‘Forced	Migrants	as	Illegal	Migrants’,	in	Elena	Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,	Gil	
Loescher,	Kathy	Long	and	Nando	Sigona	(eds.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	on	Refugee	and	Forced	Migration	Studies	
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	p.	191.		
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coming	into	being,	becoming	governable,	blending	in,	remaining	invisible	and	claiming	a	presence	or	
becoming	visible	as	some-thing/one	else.			
1.	Producing	‘Illegal’	Migrants		
Only	two	types	of	migrants	exist	in	Malaysian	law:	legal	and	illegal.	The	absence	of	the	
category	of	the	refugee	means	that	all	irregular	migrants	are	considered	illegal	migrants	and	subject	
to	the	Immigration	Act,	which	allows	for	their	detention,	deportation	and	(corporal)	punishment.10	
Their	official	non-existence	is	also	manifest	in	the	absence	of	governmental	structures	for	the	
registration	and	administration	of	refugees,	including	refugee	camps.	This	differs,	for	instance,	from	
the	situation	in	Thailand	–	also	a	non-signatory	state	to	the	UN	Refugee	Convention	–	where	refugee	
camps	do	exist.11	
Yet,	the	situation	of	the	camp	does	exist	in	Malaysia	insofar	as	‘illegal	migrants’	are	detained	in	
Immigration	Depots	–	detention	centres	in	which	migrants	are	kept	upon	arrest,	without	trial	and	in	
very	poor	conditions.	Police	and	immigration	authorities	conduct	regular	raids	against	migrants,	
assisted	by	Ikatan	Relawan	Rakyat,	or	RELA.	The	members	of	this	poorly	trained	‘People’s	Volunteer	
Force’,	which	is	tasked	to	function	as	the	‘eyes	and	ears	of	the	government’,	are	authorised	to	bear	
weapons	and	immune	from	prosecution	in	relation	to	their	conduct	as	part	of	the	volunteer	force.12	
There	have	been	numerous	reports	of	violence	and	extortion	against	migrants	on	behalf	of	RELA.13		
Drawing	on	the	work	of	Giorgio	Agamben,	Prem	Kumar	Rajaram	and	Carl	Grundy-Warr	
highlight	the	precarious	situation	and	abuse	of	migrants	in	detention	camps	in	Malaysia.	They	argue	
that	the	distinction	made	between	citizens	and	illegal	migrants	results	in	the	use	of	disciplinary	
practices	that	would	be	‘strictly	illegal’	if	applied	to	Malaysian	citizens.	All	those	considered	illegal	are	
‘cast	in	a	zone	where	illegality	and	legality	are	hard	to	discern,	and	to	whom	all	citizens	are	as	
																																																								
10	Crisp	et	al	‘our	turn’,	p.10;	Eva-Lotta	Hedman,	‘Refuge,	Governmentality	and	Citizenship:	Capturing	“Illegal	
Migrants”	in	Malaysia	and	Thailand’,	Government	and	Opposition,	42:2	(2008),	pp.	367-8;	Alice	Nah,	‘Struggling	
with	(Il)legality:	The	Indeterminate	Functioning	of	Malaysia’s	Borders	for	Asylum	Seekers,	Refugees,	and	
Stateless	Persons’,	in	Prem	Kumar	Rajaram	and	Carl	Grundy-Warr	(eds.),	Borderscapes.	Hidden	Geographies	
and	Politics	at	Territory’s	Edge	(Minneapolis	and	London:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2007),	pp.	35-36;	
Pranom	Somwong	and	Marie	Huberlant,	Undocumented	migrants	and	refugees	in	Malaysia:	Raids,	Detention	
and	Discrimination,	No.	489/2	(International	Federation	for	Human	Rights/Suaram,	2008),	p.	9.		
11	Refugee	camps	did	exist	in	Malaysia	at	the	time	of	the	so-called	Vietnamese	boat	people	refugee	crisis.	Most	
of	these	refugees	were	resettled	in	the	West.	The	last	refugee	camp	closed	in	2001.		
12	Crisp	et	al	‘our	turn’,	p	1;	Hedman	‘Refuge’,	pp.	371-2;	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs,	‘The	People’s	Volunteer	
Force’,	available	at:	{http://www.rela.gov.my/index.php/en/maklumat-rela/peranan-fungsi}	accessed	13	
January	2016.		
13	See,	for	instance:	Amnesty	International,	Trapped:	The	Exploitation	of	Migrant	Workers	in	Malaysia	(London:	
Amnesty	International	Publications:	2010);	Helen	Davidson,	‘Malaysia	accused	of	arresting	asylum	seekers	and	
refugees’,	The	Guardian	(4	September	2013);	Hedman,	‘Refuge’,	pp.	367-8;	Amy	Smith,	In	Search	of	Survival	
and	Sanctuary	in	the	City.	Refugees	from	Myanmar/Burma	in	Kuala	Lumpur,	Malaysia	(Bangkok:	International	
Rescue	Committee,	2012).		
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sovereigns.’14	Given	the	deplorable	conditions	of	migrants	in	detention	in	Malaysia	and	the	absence	
of	legal	rights,	the	invocation	of	Agamben’s	notion	of	‘bare	life’	seems	apt.	However,	as	has	been	
pointed	out	by	a	number	of	scholars,	the	ontologisation	of	this	biopolitical	state	of	exception	as	our	
contemporary	condition	is	problematic	insofar	as	it	denies	migrants	affirmative,	political	subjectivity.	
Moreover,	Agamben	situates	the	refugee	at	the	foundation	of	a	‘coming’	politics15,	yet	a	growing	
number	of	scholars	seek	to	draw	attention	to	the	political	struggles	of	(irregular)	migrants	in	this	
world.16	
Another	way	of	making	sense	of	their	precarity	is	to	contextualise	irregular	migrants	in	
Malaysia	in	relation	to	both	the	contemporary	securitisation	of	migration	–	whereby	irregular	
migrants	are	identified	with	crime	and	disease	–	as	well	as	part	of	a	longer	history	of	the	construction	
of	the	Other	as	a	(potential)	threat.17	This	became	sharply	articulated,	for	instance,	during	the	
Malayan	Emergency	–	the	post-WWII	communist	insurgency	–,	during	which	“the	communist”	
became	the	dangerous	Other	within,	and	the	categories	of	“Chinese”,	“communist”	and	“terrorist”	
became	all	too	readily	linked.	The	1960	Internal	Security	Act,	emergency	legislation	introduced	to	
contain	the	“communist	threat”	which	allows	for	detention	without	trial,	remained	in	place	until	
2012,	when	it	was	rebranded	under	a	new	name	(Security	Offences	(Special	Measures)	Act).	More	
recently,	the	‘illegal	migrant’	has	become	the	dangerous	Other,	as	exemplified	by	a	remark	made	by	
the	Director-General	of	RELA,	the	People’s	Volunteer	Force	involved	in	immigration	raids.	In	an	
interview	with	The	New	York	Times,	the	DG,	Zaidon	Asmuni,	explains:	‘We	have	no	more	Communists	
at	the	moment,	but	we	are	now	facing	illegal	immigrants.’	And,	according	to	Asmuni,	‘in	Malaysia	
illegal	immigrants	are	enemy	no.	2’	–	drugs	top	the	list	of	enemies.18		
In	her	article	on	irregular	migrants	in	Thailand	and	Malaysia,	Eva-Lotta	Hedman	suggests	that	
expulsion	‘constitutes	a	distinct	realm	for	the	social	(re)production	of	certain	forms	of	
governmentality	and	national	citizenship,	closely	intertwined	with	the	(contested)	political	dynamics	
																																																								
14	Prem	Kumar	Rajaram	and	Carl	Grundy-Warr,	‘The	Irregular	Migrant	as	Homo	Sacer:	Migration	and	Detention	
in	Australia,	Malaysia	and	Thailand’,	International	Migration,	42:1	(2004),	p.	50.		
15	For	Agamben,	the	refugee	is	a	‘limit-concept’	that	challenges	the	prevailing	account	of	politics	defined	in	
terms	of	citizens,	rights	and	the	nation-state.	In	this	respect,	the	figure	of	the	refugee	could	stand	at	the	basis	
of	a	‘coming	political	community’	beyond	the	nation-state.	See:	Giorgio	Agamben,	Homo	Sacer.	Sovereign	
Power	and	Bare	Life	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press:	1995),	p.	78.	
16		See	McNevin,	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’,	pp.	194-5,	for	a	critique	of	this	particular	point.	See	footnote	4	
for	on	this	body	of	literature	more	generally.	
17	Helen	Nesadurai,	‘Malaysia’s	conflict	with	the	Philippines	and	Indonesia	over	labour	migration:	economic	
security,	interdependence	and	conflict	trajectories’,	The	Pacific	Review,	26:1	(2013),	p.	93;	Ernst	Spaan,	Ton	
van	Naerssen	and	Gerard	Kohl,	‘Re-Imagining	Borders:	Malay	Identity	and	Indonesian	Migrants	in	Malaysia’,	
Tijdschrift	voor	Economische	en	Sociale	Geografie,	93:2	(2002),	p.	166.	
18	Quoted	in	Seth	Mydans,	‘A	Growing	Source	of	Fear	for	Migrants	in	Malaysia’,	New	York	Times	(10	December	
2007).		
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of	state	and	society	in	contemporary	Malaysia’.19	The	production	of	the	Malay	and	Malaysian	
identities	is	dependent	on	the	continued	employment	of	various	forms	of	governmentality	in	the	
realms	of	law,	education,	religion,	language	and	security	in	which	identities	are	produced,	linked	and	
opposed	to	different	internal	and	external	Others.	The	production	of	the	‘illegal	migrant’	is	part	of	
these	processes.			
The	emergence	of	the	dangerous	Other	can	thus	be	seen	in	light	of	a	broader	trajectory	of	the	
ethno-racial	differentiation	of	people	(e.g.	into	Malay,	Chinese	and	Indian)	through	practices	of	
categorisation	and	exclusion.	Drawing	on	Foucault’s	notion	of	governmentality,	Hedman	shows	how	
the	negative	construction	of	migrants	as	the	Other	feeds	into	the	affirmative	production	of	
Malaysian	identity.	However,	what	is	missing	from	this	analysis,	in	which	the	‘illegal	migrant’	is	a	
product	primarily	of	practices	of	governmentality,	is	a	consideration	of	the	relationship	between	
governance	and	resistance,	both	in	Foucault’s	work	and	in	the	context	of	irregular	migrants	in	
Malaysia.	For	Foucault,	power	is	not	simply	negative	or	repressive;	it	is	productive	of	things.	Rather	
than	being	imposed	from	above,	or	from	an	external	point,	power	can	be	seen	as	a	‘productive	
network	which	runs	through	the	whole	social	body’.20	Power	is	something	that	circulates	in	a	‘netlike	
organisation’,	which	means	that	‘[i]t	is	never	localised	here	or	there,	never	in	anybody’s	hands’	and	
that	people	‘are	always	in	a	position	of	simultaneously	undergoing	and	exercising	this	power.’21		
As	such	power	is	productive,	and	not	totalising	but	fragmented,	and	hence	intricately	bound	
up	with	resistance.	In	his	earlier	work,	Foucault	refers	to	this	relationship	as	a	field	of	forces,	which	
means	power	and	resistance	are	reversible	–	continuously	being	‘turned	round’	in	both	directions.22		
In	his	later	work,	and	especially	in	the	text	‘The	Subject	and	Power’,	Foucault	relates	power	to	
freedom	and	describes	it	in	terms	of	conduct	–	or	action	on	actions	of	others	–,	which	is	a	question	of	
governance.	The	next	sections	will	draw	on	the	notion	of	power	as	a	form	of	conduct,	i.e.	as	a	form	
of	governance	productive	of	things,	in	order	to	explore	the	relationship	between	governance	and	
resistance,	which	remains	under-researched	in	scholarship	on	Foucault,	and	on	migration.23	For	
instance,	to	examine	how	‘subjects	are	gradually,	progressively,	really	and	materially	constituted	
through	a	multiplicity	of	organisms,	forces,	energies,	materials,	desires,	thoughts,	etc.’24		
																																																								
19	Hedman,	‘Refuge’,	p.	366.		
20	Michel	Foucault,	‘Truth	and	Power’	in	Power/Knowledge.	Selected	Interviews	and	Other	Writings	1972-1977	
(Brighton:	Harvester	Press,	1980),	p.	119.		
21	Michel	Foucault,	‘Two	Lectures’	in	Power/Knowledge,	p.	98.		
22	Colin	Gordon,	‘Afterword’	in	Power/Knowledge,	p.	256.		
23	Whilst	a	number	of	publications	discuss	both	governance	and	resistance,	their	relationship	is	often	not	
explored.	E.g.	see:	McNevin,	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’;	Moulin	and	Nyers	‘Country	of	UNHCR’;	Puumula,	
‘Political	life’;	Scheel	and	Ratfisch,	‘Refugee	protection’;	Squire,	‘Contested	politics’;	Walters,	‘Foucault	and	
Frontiers’;	Tazzioli	and	Walters,	‘Sight	of	Migration’.	
24	Foucault,	‘Truth	and	Power’,	p.	97.	
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2.	Producing	Refugees			
By	exploring	the	relationship	of	governance	and	resistance	as	a	productive	play,	the	focus	of	
attention	moves	from	the	violence	of	the	state	and	the	agency	of	actors	to	the	relationality	of	forces.	
Moreover,	insofar	as	actors	are	important,	we	shift	away	from	the	state	as	the	main	actor	to	the	
practices	of	various	other	bodies	and	organisations,	such	as	the	UNHCR,	NGOs,	community	
organisations,	irregular	migrants	and	volunteers.		
The	ways	in	which	the	international	plays	out	through	the	role	of	the	UNHCR	is	especially	
significant	in	this	context.	Whilst	Malaysia	is	not	the	only	non-signatory	state	to	the	UN	Refugee	
Convention	in	Southeast	Asia25,	the	combination	of	an	absence	of	nationally	managed	procedures	
and	structures	with	extensive	international	governance	within	a	rather	informal	and	contingent	
environment	is	distinct.	On	the	one	hand,	no	asylum	system	or	other	governmental	structures	
relating	to	refugees	exist	at	the	national	level,	whilst,	on	the	other,	the	UNHCR	has	extensive	
capacities,	taking	up	functions	often	assumed	to	be	the	prerogative	of	the	state.26	In	the	words	of	a	
UNHCR	policy	report:	
the	organisation	finds	itself	directly	responsible	for	almost	every	aspect	of	the	protection	
and	well-being	of	the	country’s	refugees:	registration,	status	determination,	
documentation,	detention	monitoring,	best	interest	determinations	for	children,	
resettlement,	assistance	in	the	areas	of	health,	education	and	livelihoods,	as	well	as	
community	outreach,	community	development	and	the	search	for	durable	solutions,	
including	resettlement.27		
Thus,	whilst	the	government	officially	recognises	neither	the	existence	of	refugees	nor	the	presence	
of	the	UNHCR	in	the	country,	Malaysia	is	one	of	the	UNHCR’s	busiest	status	determination	
operations	in	the	world,	both	in	terms	of	the	number	of	people	registered	and	the	number	of	people	
resettled	on	an	annual	basis.		
Through	its	far-reaching	governance	functions	at	the	national	level,	or	indeed	at	the	
intersection	of	the	international	and	the	local,	the	UNHCR	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	production	of	
subjectivities	through	practices	of	control	and	contestation	that	reach	not	only	beyond	state	
authorities	but	also	beyond	official	procedures	and	legislation.28	This	is	well-illustrated	by	the	UNHCR																																																									
25	In	fact,	most	states	in	the	region	have	not	signed	the	UN	Refugee	Convention,	including	Bangladesh,	Brunei,	
Myanmar,	Indonesia,	Laos,	Singapore,	Thailand	and	Vietnam.		
26	Cf.	Moulin	and	Nyers,	‘Country	of	UNHCR’.	
27	Crisp	et	al,	‘our	turn’,	p.	17.		
28	Compare	William	Walters’	article	on	humanitarian	borders,	in	which	he	refers	to	Foucaultian	scholarship	that	
shows	that	knowledges,	techniques	and	strategies	were	invented	across	a	great	variety	of	institutional	sites	
and	for	multiple	ends.	He	suggests	approaching	humanitarianism	‘as	a	field	which	exists	in	a	permanent	state	
of	co-option,	infiltration	but	also	provocation	with	the	state	(but	also	with	other	supranational	and	
international	entities	as	well).’	See:	Walters,	‘Foucault	and	Frontiers’,	pp.	148-9.		
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identity	card.	Upon	registration	with	the	UNHCR,	irregular	migrants	receive	an	identity	card,	granting	
them	a	kind	of	unofficial	official	status.	Unofficial	insofar	as	carrying	a	UNHCR	identity	card	does	not	
give	a	person	an	official	refugee	status	under	Malaysian	law;	and	unofficial	insofar	as	the	card	is	no	
certain	guarantee	against	arrest	and	detention	–	although,	informally,	it	should	give	a	person	this	
protection.	In	practice,	possession	of	an	identity	card	helps	to	reduce	violence	at	least	to	a	degree.	
The	identity	cards	are	official	insofar	as	irregular	migrants	gain	the	status	of	refugee	in	the	eyes	of	
the	UNHCR	as	well	as	the	“international	community”.	That	is	to	say,	the	UNHCR	does	not	so	much	
make	visible	the	existence	and	plight	of	refugees	in	Malaysia,	it	plays	a	vital	role	in	producing	the	
category	of	the	refugee	by	dividing	the	field	of	‘illegal	migrants’	into	‘refugees’	and	‘economic	
migrants’,	a	distinction	not	recognised	by	the	government.29	Whilst	those	carrying	an	identity	card	
gain	some	form	of	protection	as	well	as	a	number	of	other	benefits,	other	irregular	migrants	remain	
unrecognised.	Around	150,000	people	are	currently	registered	as	refugees	with	the	UNHCR;	the	
majority	(around	140,000)	are	from	Myanmar.	The	estimated	number	of	irregular	migrants	without	
refugee	status	is	2	million.	
The	UNHCR’s	conduct	of	registration,	status	determination	and	documentation	of	migrants	
can	be	seen	as	practices	of	governance	productive	of	a	collective	subject	that	did	not	previously	
exist.	This	subject	is	not	simply	the	Other	of	the	population,	but	somewhere	in	the	margins,	both	
included	and	excluded,	on	the	basis	of	a	break	created	in	the	field	of	‘illegal	migrants’.	Put	
differently,	refugees	come	into	being	by	becoming	visible	as	subjects	to	be	governed.	Here,	visibility	
constitutes	a	form	of	knowledge	production	that	enables	management	and	control,	as	is	discussed	
further	below.	The	collection	of	data	about	this	new	collective	subject	is	therefore	an	important	
aspect	of	this	knowledge/subject	production,	especially	since	the	government	does	not	hold	records	
on	refugees.		
Obtaining	a	UNHCR	identity	card	thus	constitutes	a	vital	aspect	of	what	can	be	called	the	
performative	production	of	refugees.	Identity	cards	were	first	introduced	in	2004,	at	a	time	when	the	
UNHCR	became	more	active	and	public	in	its	efforts	to	protect	and	gain	recognition	for	refugees	in	
Malaysia.	Beforehand,	from	2003,	the	organisation	issued	irregular	migrants	registered	with	the	
organisation	with	protection	letters,	however,	these	were	not	recognised	by	government	officials	
and	did	little	to	prevent	arrest	and	detention.	By	issuing	plastic	identity	cards	to	registered	irregular	
migrants	and	by	intervening	on	their	behalf	when	arrested	and	detained,	the	identity	card	gained	a	
																																																								
29	See,	for	instance:	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees,	UNHCR	Factsheet.	Refugees	in	Malaysia	
(Kuala	Lumpur:	UNHCR).	According	to	the	Factsheet,	‘[u]nlike	migrants,	refugees	do	not	choose	to	leave	their	
countries…The	key	difference	between	economic	migrants	and	refugees	is	that	economic	migrants	enjoy	the	
protection	of	their	home	countries;	refugees	do	not.’	
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level	of	credibility.30	Possession	of	an	identity	card	thereby	helped	to	produce	the	distinction	
between	refugees	and	illegal	migrants,	even	if	it	remained	officially	non-existent.		
The	identity	card	can	be	seen	to	function	as	a	practice	of	security	in	the	Foucaultian	sense	in	
respect	of	the	entwinement	of	freedom	and	security.31	The	‘freedom’	that	comes	with	holding	an	
identity	card,	and	the	subjectivity	it	helps	to	create	–	becoming	a	refugee	–,	is	bound	up	with	the	
production	of	a	framework	that	is	disciplinary	and	exclusionary:	it	produces	and	reinforces	both	the	
domain	of	‘freedom’	and	the	border	between	inclusion	and	exclusion.	Migrants	carrying	an	identity	
card	are	less	prone	to	sovereign	violence,	yet	they	also	become	visible	and	eligible	as	subjects	to	be	
managed	and	regulated,	in	this	case	primarily	on	behalf	of	the	UNHCR.	In	addition,	the	identity	cards	
have	an	exclusionary	–	or	decollectivising	–	function,	through	the	production	of	several	divisions,	
such	as	that	between	those	who	are	eligible	for	protection	and	those	who	are	not,	as	well	as	the	
division	between	those	who	hold	a	UNHCR	identity	card	and	those	whose	registration	with	the	
UNHCR	is	pending.32	The	latter	division	is	especially	significant	given	the	long	waiting	times	for	
registration,	as	discussed	below.		
The	division	of	the	field	of	migrants	into	refugees	to	be	protected	and	‘economic	migrants’	
(according	to	the	UNHCR)	or	‘illegal	migrants’	(according	to	the	government)	constitutes	a	form	of	
knowledge	production	with	very	real	effects	on	the	lives	of	those	granted	or	denied	refugee	status.	It	
is	not	only	a	matter	of	being	more	or	less	vulnerable	to	the	violence	of	the	state;	a	number	of	other	
benefits	are	attached	to	registration	with	the	UNHCR	and	possession	of	an	identity	card,	such	as	
eligibility	for	resettlement	in	a	third	country	and	discount	on	treatment	in	government	hospitals.	
More	broadly,	as	Scheel	and	Ratfisch	contend,	the	UNHCR’s	expanding	governance	capacities	
internationally	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	the	merging	of	practices	and	discourses	of	refugee	
protection	with	those	of	migration	management.	They	relate	this	development	to	the	organisation’s	
‘monopoly	over	knowledge	production	on	asylum,	refugees	and	forced	migration’.33	In	the	Malaysian	
context,	this	monopoly	is	undermined	in	several	ways	due	to	the	informality	of	practices	around	
identity	cards,	as	discussed	next.	It	is,	for	instance,	resisted	by	government	officials’	nonrecognition	
of	cards	as	well	as	by	migrants’	use	of	fake	cards.34	Moreover,	the	UNHCR’s	knowledge	production	
consists	of	practices	of	both	governance	and	resistance.		
																																																								
30	Nah,	‘Struggling	with	(Il)legality’,	p.	55.	
31	Michel	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France	1977-78,	trans.		Graham	
Burchell	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007),	p.	48;	Michel	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics.	Lectures	at	
the	Collège	de	France,	1978-79,	trans.	Graham	Burchell	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2010),	p.	65.		
32	Cf.	Scheel	and	Ratfisch,	‘Refugee	Protection’,	p.	928.			
33	Ibid.,	p.	926.		
34	See	Moulin	and	Nyers,	‘Country	of	UNHCR’,	for	a	different	account	of	the	contestation	of	the	UNHCR’s	
monopoly	of	knowledge	production,	whereby	refugees	re-appropriate	the	category	of	the	refugee	direct	
resistance	to	the	UNHCR.		
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3.	Governance-Resistance				
The	UNHCR	identity	card	not	only	produces	governable	subjects;	it	also	performs	a	more	
affirmative	function.	By	obtaining	an	identity	card,	irregular	migrants	can	claim	a	subjectivity	other	
than	dangerous	Other,	even	if	this	production	is	intricately	bound	up	with	forms	of	governance.	The	
UNHCR’s	governance	through	identity	cards,	as	a	tool	of	identity	creation	constitutes	at	the	very	
same	time	a	means	of	resistance	–	a	claim	to	an	affirmative	identity	against	officially	declared	
illegality	of	all	irregular	migrants	–	and	a	mode	of	governance,	management	and	exclusion.	In	a	
country	where	an	identity	card	is	required	to	undertake	a	large	variety	of	tasks,	from	opening	a	bank	
account	to	gaining	entry	to	a	gated	residential	condo,	irregular	migrants	resist	their	illegality	by	
possessing	and	using	the	UNHCR	identity	card.	The	partial	recognition	of	these	cards	by	immigration	
officers	and	police	is	an	indication	of	the	potential	force	of	this	resistance	(embedded	in	governance).		
The	question	here	is	not	so	much	whether,	or	under	which	conditions,	something	can	be	seen	
as	power	or	resistance.	Instead,	following	Foucault,	we	could	point	out	that	practices	of	resistance	
are	readily	reinscribed	in	relations	of	power,	and	employ	it	as	an	illustration	of	the	‘reversibility’	of	
power	and	resistance.	However,	in	this	case	relationality	pushes	beyond	the	idea	that,	as	part	of	a	
play	of	force-relations,	governance	and	resistance	are	continuously	‘turned	round.’35	Rather,	the	
same	practices	function	as	governance	and	resistance	simultaneously:	it	is	a	play	of	governance-
resistance	productive	of	particular	knowledges	and	subjectivities.	For	instance,	by	showing	one’s	
UNHCR	identity	card	when	stopped	by	police,	a	migrant	simultaneously	resists	illegalisation	and	
enacts	a	governed	refugee	identity.	This	means,	in	turn,	that	resistance	is	–	like	power	–	not	the	
intentional	action	of	a	pre-constituted	subject	but	a	force	that	both	disrupts	and	constitutes.	As	Eeva	
Puumula	suggests	with	reference	to	Phillip	Darby:	resistance	does	not	need	to	be	explicitly	expressed	
for	it	to	contest	a	particular	conception	of	political	community;	and,	agency	does	not	necessarily	
derive	from	a	common	strategy	or	identity.36		
The	notion	of	governance-resistance	thus	draws	on,	yet	pushes	further,	existing	
conceptualisations	of	migrant	resistance,	such	as	‘agency’,	‘autonomy’,	‘ambivalence’	and	
‘irregularity’.	Engagements	with	the	notions	of	‘agency’	and	‘autonomy	of	migration’	tend	to	focus	
primarily	on	resistance,	which	is	understood	as	a	form	of	intentional	action.	Moreover,	the	
relationship	between	power	and	resistance,	if	conceptualised,	is	understood	in	oppositional	terms,	
which	underplays	the	random	and	fragmented	character	of	both	governance	and	contestation	as	
																																																								
35	On	‘reversibility’,	see:	Tazzioli	and	Walters,	‘Sight	of	Migration’;	on	‘re-inscription’,	see:	McNevin	
‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’.		
36	Puumula,	‘Political	life’,	pp.	955-6;	see	also:	Phillip	Darby,	‘Pursuing	the	Political:	A	Postcolonial	Rethinking	of	
Relations	International’,	Millennium:	Journal	of	International	Studies,	33:1	(2004),	pp.	1-34.			
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well	as	their	intricate	relationality.37	The	concepts	of	‘ambivalence’	and	‘irregularity’	were	developed	
to	offer	a	more	complex	and	dynamic	account,	for	instance	by	highlighting	the	‘reversibility’	of	power	
and	resistance,	or	the	complex	relationship	between	mobility	and	control.38	Nonetheless,	the	
question	of	how	these	relations	play	out	is	not	elaborated	upon,	nor	conceptualised	in	terms	of	the	
simultaneity	of	governance-resistance	as	a	play	of	forces.		
The	importance	of	thinking	beyond	the	intentional	actions	of	pre-constituted	identities	and	
entities,	and	towards	a	play	of	forces	of	governance-resistance,	also	becomes	manifest	by	
considering	the	material,	or	material-discursive,	dimensions	of	identity	cards	and	checks.	As	
Jonathan	Darling	argues	in	relation	to	the	affective	power	of	letters	from	the	Home	Office	received	
by	asylum	seekers	in	the	UK:	asylum	governance	is	‘a	material	matter,	an	issue	of	things,	
associations,	collectives’	as	well	as	their	multiple	entanglements,	whereas	the	migrant	is	
continuously	‘being	made	and	re-made	by	a	confluence	of	discourses	and	materials	in	interaction.’39	
These	letters,	but	also	identity	cards	and	checks,	constitute	a	materialisation	of	the	state	that	help	to	
produce	migrants	as	legal	or	illegal,	deserving	or	criminal.	Whilst	part	of	the	material-discursive	force	
of	these	letters	from	the	Home	Office	lies	in	their	authority,	the	more-or-less	(in)formal	UNHCR	
identity	cards	contain	the	ambiguous	potential	to	materialise	by	asserting	and/or	subverting	state	
authority	(as	well	as	international	governance).		
Whichever	way(s)	this	plays	out,	Darling’s	point	is	that	these	documents	have	what	Jane	
Bennett	calls	‘thing-power’:	the	identity	card	‘does	something’,	it	can	‘perform	actions,	produce	
effects,	and	alter	situations.’40	Importantly,	it	is	not	the	‘thing’	as	such	that	performs	or	acts,	but	the	
play	of	forces	that	constitutes	both	the	things	or	subjects	and	the	environment	in	which	they	
emerge.	Put	differently,	the	way	things,	events	and	discourse	are	made	to	function	in	conjunction	
with	one	another.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	identity	checks	in	Malaysia,	what	produces	someone	as	
a	refugee	or	illegal	migrant	comprises	a	confluence	of	elements,	such	as	a	road	block;	police	officers,	
and	their	official	and/or	personal	stance	towards	migrants,	or	bribes;	their	knowledge	and	
understanding	of	UNHCR	processes,	or	the	force	of	UNHCR	knowledge	production;	whether	or	not	
the	check	happens	during	an	official	period	of	migration	raids;	the	identity	card,	and	how	“genuine”																																																									
37	McNevin,	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’,	p.	193.	On	‘agency’,	e.g.	see:	Moulin	and	Nyers,	‘Country	of	
UNHCR’;	Nyers,	‘Abject	cosmopolitanism’;	Rygiel,	‘Bordering	solidarities’;	on	‘autonomy’,	e.g.	see	Mezzadra	and	
Neilson,	Né	qui’;	Sandro	Mezzadra,	‘The	gaze	of	autonomy:	capitalism,	migration	and	social	struggles’	in	Vicky	
Squire	(ed.),	The	Contested	Politics	of	Mobility:	Borderzones	and	Irregularity	(New	York:	Routledge,	2011);	
Papadopolous	et	al,	‘Escape	routes’.			
38	On	‘ambivalence’,	see:	McNevin,	‘Ambivalence	and	Citizenship’;	on	‘irregularity’,	see:	Squire	‘Contested	
politics’.			
39	Jonathan	Darling,	‘Another	letter	from	the	Home	Office:	reading	the	material	politics	of	asylum’,	
Environment	and	Planning	D:	Society	and	Space	32:	3	(2014),	pp.	485,	495			
40	Jane	Bennett,	‘The	force	of	things:	steps	toward	an	ecology	of	matter’,	Political	Theory	
32:3	(2004),	p.	355.	See	also:	Darling,	‘Another	letter’,	p.	490.		
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it	looks;	the	migrant,	perhaps	his	or	her	looks	(more	or	less	“foreign”),	and	his	or	her	nervousness	or	
confidence	and/or	familiarity	with	identity	checks	and	state	violence;	his	or	her	ability	or	willingness	
to	pay	a	bribe,	etc.41		
In	this	context,	the	notion	of	play	seems	apt	both	because	it	accounts	for	the	dynamic	
interaction	of	material-discursive	forces,	and	because	practices	of	governance-resistance	are	marked	
by	high	levels	of	informality	and	contingency.	As	suggested	above,	depending	on	how	the	material-
discursive	forces	interact,	immigration	officers	or	police	might	recognise	the	UNHCR	identity	card	as	
a	legal	document,	or	they	might	look	the	other	way	when	encountering	irregular	migrants,	at	other	
times	they	might	not.42	Or,	irregular	migrants	are	able	to	pay	a	bribe	to	avoid	arrest	and/or	
detention.	There	is	also	a	thriving	market	in	fake	identity	cards,	which	allows	police	and	immigration	
officials	to	claim	that	possession	of	an	identity	card	does	not	confirm	someone	is	a	refugee.43	This,	in	
their	eyes,	justifies	the	continued	arrest,	detention	and	punishment	of	identity	card	holders.	
Nevertheless,	such	claims	by	officials	can	also	be	understood	as	recognition	of	the	legitimacy	of	
(genuine)	identity	cards.	Through	the	use	of	identity	cards,	within	a	wider	play	of	elements	and	
forces,	irregular	migrants	are	able	to	constitute	themselves	as	refugees	in	resistance	to	official	
illegality	even	though	this	remains	a	contingent	and	uncertain	process.		
Refugee	subjectivities	also	come	into	being	through	practices	of	governance-resistance	in	
relation	to	the	UNHCR.	This	is	manifest,	for	instance,	in	the	process	of	obtaining	an	identity	card.	The	
UNHCR	in	Malaysia	is	both	understaffed	and	underfunded,	which	has	resulted	in	a	large	backlog	in	
the	registration	process	and	long	waiting	periods	for	migrants	to	obtain	an	identity	card.	Due	to	
these	capacity	limitations,	the	UNHCR	draws	on	refugee	community	organisations	for	information	
and	support.	Set	up	by	various	Burmese	refugee	groups,	these	organisations	are	mostly	organised	
along	ethnic	lines.	E.g.	the	Chin,	Mon,	Karen,	Rohingya,	Shan	and	Kachin	each	have	their	own	
community	organisation(s).	In	Myanmar,	as	in	Malaysia,	ethnic	divisions	are	prime	markers	of	
identity.	The	organisations	assist	the	UNHCR	in	the	registration	process	by	pre-registering	migrants	in	
their	community	through	the	composition	of	lists	of	people	on	the	basis	of	which	the	UNHCR	
proceeds	with	the	registration	process.	The	participation	of	community	organisations	in	the	UNHCR’s	
practices	of	governance-resistance	facilitated	the	registration	of	75,000	migrants	between	2008-
2010.44																																																										
41	Cf.	Leif	Johnson,	‘Material	Interventions	on	the	US–Mexico	Border:	Investigating	a	Sited	Politics	of	Migrant	
Solidarity’,	Antipode	47:5	(2015).	
42	Alice	Nah,	‘Seeking	refuge	in	Kuala	Lumpur:	Self-help	strategies	to	reduce	vulnerability	amongst	refugees’,	in	
S.G.	Yeoh	(ed.),	The	other	Kuala	Lumpur:	Living	in	the	Shadows	of	a	globalising	Southeast	Asian	city	(London	
and	New	York:	Routledge,	2014),	p.	153.		
43	Ibid.,	pp.	156-7.	See	also:	Gerhard	Hoffstaedter,	‘Place-making:	Chin	refugees,	citizenship	and	the	state	in	
Malaysia’,	Citizenship	Studies,	18:8	(2014),	p.	878.	
44	Crisp	et	al,	‘our	turn’,	p.	21.		
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At	first	sight,	this	seems	to	imply	a	paradox	of	protection	and	self-reliance,	as	Moulin	and	
Nyers	point	out	in	relation	to	the	UNHCR’s	position	in	Egypt:	the	UNHCR’s	push	to	self-reliance	and	
self-governance	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	its	typical	depiction	of	refugees	as	those	‘dependent	on	
the	agency’s	recognition	and	care.’45	However,	in	Malaysia	at	least,	the	discourse	of	‘self	help’	has	
become	an	intrinsic	part	of	its	operation	in	the	country,	mostly	due	to	the	UNHCR’s	under-capacity	in	
combination	with	the	absence	of	constructive	government	involvement.	‘Project	Self	Help’,	initiated	
in	2011,	offers	a	positive	(neo-liberal)	spin	on	this	situation	as	an	initiative	to	help	refugees	help	
themselves,	e.g.	through	education.46	As	the	next	section	elaborates,	it	stimulates	them	to	do	what	
they	were	to	a	large	degree	already	doing	themselves.	In	this	respect,	self-reliance	and	self-
governance	have	transformed	from	being	paradoxical	to	becoming	an	intrinsic	part	of	the	
organisation’s	governance-resistance	of	refugees	in	Malaysia.		
Nonetheless,	self-governance	has	limits:	it	stops	at	the	creation	of	political	agency.	That	is	to	
say,	when	it	is	taken	in	directions	not	favoured	by	the	UNHCR,	or	one	could	call	it	the	problem	of	the	
wrong	kind	of	politics.	As	a	UNHCR	report	notes:		
while	registration	through	refugee	associations	has	proven	to	be	an	effective	and	efficient	
approach	in	a	situation	where	the	demands	made	on	UNHCR	outstrip	its	capacity,	such	
arrangements	place	considerable	power	in	the	hands	of	community	leaders	and	run	the	
risk	of	facilitating	corrupt	practices.47		
These	‘corrupt	practices’	relate	to	accusations	made	against	refugee	community	organisations	of	
prioritising	certain	people	on	the	pre-registration	list,	namely	those	who	pay	a	fee	or	are	part	of	the	
same	ethnic	sub-group	–	different	ethnic	sub-groups	exist	within	the	various	ethnic	communities	
from	Myanmar.	In	the	case	of	Chin	refugees,	for	instance,	the	controversy	surrounding	the	Chin	
Refugee	Committee’s	(CRC)	role	in	the	pre-registration	process	in	relation	to	prioritising	certain	
groups	led	to	the	founding	of	a	second	Chin	community	organisation,	the	Alliance	for	Chin	Refugees	
(ACR),	which	is	explicitly	committed	to	supporting	all	Chin	refugees.48	The	internal	politics	of	
community	organisations	functions	as	a	form	of	ordering	and	control	productive	of	ethnic	refugee	
subjectivities	based	on	distinctions	between	some	and	others	–	and	can	thus	be	said	to	fit	in	with	
Malaysian	ethnic	politics	–	whilst	operating	as	a	force	of	resistance	against	the	modes	of	governance	
favoured	by	the	UNHCR.	The	UNHCR,	struggling	to	grasp	the	complex	dynamics	of	the	various	
																																																								
45	Moulin	and	Nyers,	‘Country	of	UNHCR’,	p.	363.		
46	See:	UNHCR	Malaysia,	‘About	Project	Self	Help’,	available	at:	{http://www.unhcr.org.my/Project_Self_Help-
@-About_Project_Self_Help.aspx}	accessed	13	January	2016.		
47	Crisp	et	al	‘our	turn’,	p.	22.	
48	Zhuang	Wubin,	Chin	Refugees:	A	Life	in	Kuala	Lumpur	(Asian	Geographic	Society,	2007).	See	also:	Nah,	
‘Seeking	refuge’,	p.	162.		
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refugee	communities	in	Malaysia,	thus	becomes	caught	up	in	the	internal	politics	and	struggles	of	
(self-)governance-resistance	of	community	organisations.49				
A	related	mode	of	(self-)governance	and	identity	creation	is	at	play	in	relation	to	the	identity	
cards	issued	by	the	refugee	community	organisations.	These	cards,	which	all	members	receive,	offer	
a	form	of	protection	especially	for	those	who	have	not	(yet)	obtained	a	UNHCR	card.	Although	the	
community	organisation	cards	gain	less	recognition	than	the	UNHCR	cards,	they	do	offer	some	
protection	–	e.g.	by	explaining	in	the	migrant’s	native	language	what	to	do	in	case	of	arrest	–	and	
function	to	create	an	ethnicity-based	migrant	identity.50	More	generally,	community	organisations	
play	an	important	role	in	the	lives	of	irregular	migrants	in	the	sense	that	they	offer	advice	and	
assistance	–	for	instance	regarding	employment	and	healthcare	–	as	well	as	education,	in	the	form	of	
refugee	schools.		
This	suggests	that	refugee	subjectivities	are	not	merely	produced	through	UNHCR	governance-
resistance	but	also	through	migrant	practices	and	strategies.	From	the	perspective	of	the	irregular	
migrant,	becoming	refugee	can	be	both	useful	and	essential	in	terms	of	gaining	a	form	of	protection	
as	well	as	access	to	work,	education	and	healthcare.	This	strategic	aspect	of	becoming	a	refugee	as	
well	as	the	contingency	and	informality	of	the	material-discursive	practices	of	governance-resistance	
at	play	means	that	“the	refugee”	as	such	–	as	a	stable	individual	or	collective	subject	–	does	not	exist.	
In	a	similar	vein,	Liisa	Malkki	shows	that	the	label	of	refugee	is	tactically	employed	and	rejected	in	
different	ways	by	Burundian	refugees	in	Tanzania.	Depending	on	the	social	setting,	it	is	better	to	
become	visible	as	refugee	and	be	eligible	for	protection,	or	to	make	oneself	invisible	by	not	looking	
like	a	refugee	at	all.51	Not	unlike	some	of	the	groups	of	migrants	discussed	by	Malkki,	irregular	
migrants	from	Myanmar	with	refugee	status	often	identify	more	with	their	(sub)ethnic	community	
and/or	religion	than	with	being	a	refugee.	Hence,	it	can	be	said	that	the	play	of	practices	is	mobile	
not	only	with	respect	to	the	reversibility	and	simultaneity	of	governance-resistance	but	also	with	
regard	to	the	subjectivities	that	come	into	being,	which	are	simultaneously	produced,	shifting,	
adopted	and	contested.		
A	crucial	strategic	aspect	of	becoming	refugee	through	registration	with	the	UNHCR	is	
becoming	eligible	for	resettlement.	Most	irregular	migrants	with	refugee	status	in	Malaysia	do	not	
wish	to	make	a	claim	to	being	part	the	country;	they	do	not	seek	to	settle	but	to	move	on.	For	them,	
Malaysia	is	a	temporary	stop	over,	en	route	to	the	desired	resettlement	in	“the	West”.	The	UNHCR’s	
sole	responsibility	for	resettling	refugees	is	indicative	of	the	far-reaching	effects	of	its	migration	
management	capacities	–	both	nationally	and	internationally	–	by	getting	involved	in	the	politics	of																																																									
49	E.g.	see	Crisp	et	al	‘our	turn’,	p.	23.		
50	Smith,	‘Search	of	Survival’,	p.	37.		
51	Malkki,	‘Purity	and	exile’.		
	 16	
deciding	who	gets	to	move	where	an	when.	Hence,	it	is	no	surprise	that	the	political	demand	for	
resettlement	has	been	made	to	the	UNHCR	by	means	of	refugee	protests	in	different	contexts,	such	
as	Egypt,	Morocco,	Tunisia,	India	and	Yemen.52	This	can	be	seen	as	a	form	of	direct	‘oppositional’	
resistance	against	the	UNHCR,	however,	it	can	also	play	out	as	a	more	subtle	subversion	of	the	idea	
of	having	to	be	part	of	one	country	or	another,	which	the	idea	of	resettlement	still	implies.	Albeit	in	a	
different	context,	this	more	mobile	politics	is	well	illustrated	in	Luis	Fernandez	and	Joel	Olson’s	
discussion	of	the	Repeal	Coalition	in	Arizona.	This	grassroots	movement	of	irregular	migrants	carries	
the	slogan	‘to	live,	love	and	work	anywhere	you	please’	in	its	campaign	for	the	abolition	of	anti-
immigration	legislation.		These	migrants	‘are	fighting	for	the	right	to	come	and	go	more	than	they	are	
for	the	right	to	come	and	stay.’53		
4.	Visual	Politics	of	(In)visibility	
As	suggested	above,	the	governance-resistance	of	irregular	migrants	in	Malaysia	can	be	
conceptualised	in	terms	of	(in)visibility,	of	becoming	or	making	visible	and/or	invisible.	In	his	early	
work	on	discipline,	Foucault	famously	wrote	that	‘visibility	is	a	trap.’54	It	is	by	being	seen,	or	
presuming	one	is	seen,	by	an	all-seeing	power	that	remains	invisible,	that	disciplinary	power	
operates.	However,	as	Martina	Tazzioli	and	William	Walters	suggest,	the	disciplinary	gaze	is	only	one	
way	of	making	sense	of	the	question	of	visibility	in	Foucault’s	work.	Instead,	they	argue	that	we	
should	think	of	it	‘not	as	a	gaze	that	emanates	from	places	of	authority,	but	a	more	complex	and	
variegated	field	in	which	multiple	practices	and	orders	of	visibility	intersect,	resulting	in	relations	of	
combination,	contradiction	and	conflict.’55		
We	could	thus	speak	of	a	play	of	(in)visibility.	This	refers	to	two	interrelated	aspects,	which	will	
be	examined	in	turn.	Firstly,	a	visual	sense	of	seeing	or	not-seeing,	which	is	perfectly	expressed	in	
RELA’s	mission	to	be	the	‘eyes	and	ears	of	the	government’.	This	visual	conception	often	has	a	spatial	
dimension,	as	in	Foucault’s	panopticon.	Unlike	this	disciplinary	gaze,	however,	it	will	be	suggested	
																																																								
52	For	Egypt,	see:	Moulin	and	Nyers,	‘Country	of	UNHCR’,	p.	361;	for	Morocco,	see:	Scheel	and	Ratfisch,	
‘Refugee	Protection’,	p.	934;	for	Tunisia,	see:	Tazzioli,	‘Spaces	of	Governmentality’,	p.	107;	for	India,	see:	
UNHCR,	‘Chin	refugees	protest	in	New	Delhi,	demand	resettlement	from	UN	‘,	Refugees	Daily,	available	at:	
{http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=5588edd95}	accessed	13	January	2016;	
for	Yemen,	see:	Reliefweb,	‘Yemen:	Somalia	Refugees	Demand	Relocation’,	available	at:	
{http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-somalia-refugees-demand-relocation}	accessed	13	January	2016.		
53	Luis	Fernandez	and	Joel	Olson,	‘To	live,	love	and	work	anywhere	you	please’,	Contemporary	Political	Theory,	
10:3	(2011),	pp.	412-19.		
54	Michel	Foucault,	Discipline	and	Punish:	The	Birth	of	the	Prison	(London:	Penguin,	1991),	p.	200.		
55	Tazzioli	and	Walters,	‘Sight	of	Migration	‘.	For	literature	on	migration	that	focuses	on	visibility	in	relation	to	
disciplinary	power,	see:	Simone	Browne,	‘Getting	Carded:	Border	Control	and	the	Politics	of	Canada’s	
Permanent	Resident	Card’,	Citizenship	Studies	9:4	(2005);	Mark	B.	Salter,	‘Passports,	Mobility,	and	Security:	
How	smart	can	the	border	be?’,	International	Studies	Perspectives	5	(2004).		
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that	both	visibility	and	invisibility	can	function	as	either	governance	or	resistance56,	and	certain	
practices	constitute	visibility	and	invisibility	simultaneously.	Secondly,	as	already	mentioned,	
(in)visibility	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	knowledge	production.	In	Security,	Territory,	Population,	
Foucault	describes	liberal	governance	precisely	as	an	effort	of	making	reality	knowable:	to	make	
something	visible	as	knowledge	is	to	make	it	governable.57	Yet,	this	could	also	take	the	form	of	
producing	something	as	ungovernable	or	making	it	unseen,	or	of	seeking	to	remain	off	the	radar	of	
knowledge	production.			
The	politics	of	(in)visibility	through	which	refugee	subjectivities	emerge	in	Malaysia	can	firstly	
be	understood	visually,	and	bound	up	with	the	production	of	a	particular	socio-political	space	or	
environment.	This	can	be	illustrated	through	a	walk	around	and	on	the	edges	of	the	Golden	Triangle,	
Kuala	Lumpur’s	commercial,	entertainment	and	shopping	hub	characterised	by	luxury	malls	and	
skyscrapers.	Walking	along	the	northern	stretch	of	Jalan	Imbi,	a	four-lane	heavy-traffic	road	edging	
the	Golden	Triangle,	one	notices	a	clear	division	between	the	luxury	shopping	malls,	tourist	hotels	
and	expensive	condos	on	the	one	side	and	the	run-down	residential	area	on	the	other.	The	latter	is	
the	living	and	community	space	of	irregular	migrants	as	well	as	of	other	less	well-off	people.	In	some	
ways,	people	with	refugee	status	live	here	invisibly,	in	the	shadow	of	the	visible	wealth	on	the	other	
side	of	the	road.	However,	in	other	respects,	the	picture	is	more	complex,	consisting	of	all	manner	of	
(in)visibilities.	For	instance,	irregular	migrants	walk	around	in	the	Golden	Triangle	and	work	in	the	
malls	and	hawker	stalls	in	surrounding	streets.	Yet,	they	easily	go	unnoticed	among	the	masses	of	
tourists,	workers	and	others	unaware	of	or	uninterested	in	their	existence.		
The	aspect	of	education	illustrates	how	(in)visibility	plays	out	through	practices	of	governance-
resistance.	Officially	illegal,	irregular	migrants	with	refugee	status	are	unable	to	attend	state	schools,	
whilst	private	school	fees	are	in	most	cases	unaffordable.	Subverting	this	denial	of	affirmative	
identity,	refugee	community	organisations	have	set	up	their	own	schools,	officially	known	as	
‘learning	centres’.	There	are	around	80	learning	centres	in	the	Kuala	Lumpur	area,	most	of	which	are	
run	by	refugee	community	organisations	with	UNHCR	support.	Other	learning	centres	are	run	by	
local	NGOs	or	religious	organisations.	The	centres	are	typically	housed	in	residential	properties	and	
may	consist	of	one	or	two	rooms	only,	which	simultaneously	function	as	community	centre	–	thus	
remaining	invisible	as	schools.	They	can	be	found	on	the	edge	of	the	Golden	Triangle,	in	houses	that	
look	especially	worn	in	contrast	to	the	shiny	luxury	malls	on	the	other	side	of	the	road.	Despite	the																																																									
56	E.g.	see:	Andrea	Brighenti,	‘	Visibility:	A	Category	for	the	Social	Sciences’,	Current	Sociology	55:3	(2007),	p.	
340.		
57	Foucault,	‘Security,	Territory,	Population’,	pp.	20	&	109.	See	also:	Leonie	Ansems	de	Vries,	Re-Imagining	a	
Politics	of	Life:	From	Governance	of	Order	to	Politics	of	Movement	(London:	Rowman	and	Littlefield	
International,	2014);	Nikolas	Rose,	Powers	of	Freedom:	Reframing	Political	Thought	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	1999),	p.	58;	Tazzioli	and	Walters,	‘Sight	of	Migration’.		
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limited	means	available	the	learning	centres	offer	a	space	for	learning	and	community	development	
and	are	thereby	creative	of	affirmative	subjectivities:	a	claim	to	a	presence	in	the	centre	of	the	
capital,	even	if	irregular	migrants	must	simultaneously	remain	invisible	in	order	to	avoid	the	risk	of	
arrest.		
Yet,	here,	too,	practices	of	resistance	are	closely	bound	up	with	modes	of	governance.	Insofar	
as	the	UNHCR	supports	and	guides	these	initiatives,	it	is	implicated	both	in	resistance	against	
illegality	and	in	the	production,	governance	and	regulation	of	refugees,	e.g.	through	the	monitoring	
and	funding	of	learning	centres.	In	addition,	the	UNHCR	employs	volunteers	who	help	out	at	the	
centres.	Many	of	these	volunteer	teachers	are	Western	“expats”	–	that	is,	migrants	who	are	normally	
not	approached	with	suspicion	–	who,	literally	or	figurative	cross	the	road	from	the	luxury	malls	and	
condos.	In	name,	the	learning	centres	follow	the	Malaysian	curriculum,	however,	in	practice,	the	
volunteers	teach	in	English,	helping	the	children	to	develop	different	ways	of	expressing	themselves.	
Simultaneously,	however,	the	volunteers	bring	along	their	own	pedagogical	and	disciplinary	ideas	
and	practices,	whether	or	not	these	are	clearly	articulated.	The	same	goes	for	the	refugee	teachers	
who	teach	in	their	own	ethnic	language.	This	is	a	departure	both	from	the	Malaysian	curriculum	and	
from	the	possibilities	of	expressing	one’s	identity	in	Myanmar,	where	teaching	and	learning	in	ethnic	
minority	languages	is	not	allowed.	Thus,	whilst	the	learning	centres	are	not	assessed,	monitored	or	
controlled	by	the	Malaysian	government	–	and	constitute	a	mode	of	resistance	against	the	
government	–	practices	of	governance	are	very	much	present	in	refugee	learning	centres.	Yet,	these	
practices	are	simultaneously	forms	of	resistance,	protection	and	identity	creation.		
The	example	of	school	uniforms	also	illustrates	the	practices	of	(in)visibility	at	play.	In	an	
attempt	to	protect	children	with	refugees	status	from	harassment	on	their	way	to	and	from	school,	
the	UNHCR	has	supplied	the	children	with	school	uniforms	and	blue	rucksacks	with	the	UNHCR	logo.	
Here,	protection,	discipline	and	resistance	through	identity	creation	come	together,	as	well	as	the	
‘thing-power’	of	UNHCR	uniforms	and	rucksacks.	Wearing	a	uniform	can	be	seen	as	a	disciplinary	
technique	mediated	through	the	UNHCR,	however,	in	the	case	of	these	children,	it	is	also	a	form	of	
protection.	The	self-disciplinary	practices	of	taking	certain	routes	to	school	and	avoiding	other	areas	
function	in	a	similar	manner.	Walking	to	school	in	their	uniforms	and	carrying	UNHCR	rucksacks	
renders	the	children	more	visible	on	the	streets,	however,	at	the	same	time,	it	allows	them	to	blend	
in	with	other	(Malaysian)	children	on	their	way	to	school.	This	(in)visibility	–	to	be	there;	and	to	be	
like	everyone	else	–	is	a	practice	of	resistance	against	illegality	and	thereby	part	of	the	creation	of	an	
affirmative	subjectivity	both	as	refugee	and	as	pupil.	Put	differently,	it	is	a	practice	both	of	invisibility	
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and	of	becoming	visible	as	some-thing/one	else.58	This	also	links	to	the	conception	of	visibility	as	
knowledge	production,	however,	in	this	case	to	become	visible	is	not	only	to	be	produced	as	
governable	(by	the	UNHCR),	but	also	to	resist	(being	an	‘illegal	migrant’).	
Similar	practices	of	(in)visibility	are	at	play	in	relation	to	irregular	migrants	who	commute	to	
and	from	work.	Alice	Nah	describes	how	they	are	‘blending	in	with	the	cityscape’	and	try	to	look	like	
Malaysians,	for	instance	by	not	walking	along	highways,	which	it	is	thought	only	foreigners	do.59	
Another	strategy	for	remaining	invisible	to	police	and	migration	officers	consists	of	changing	one’s	
route	to	work	or	jumping	off	the	bus	when	noticing	or	hearing	about	a	roadblock	ahead.	Other	
irregular	migrants	practice	a	form	of	self-disciplinary	invisibility	through	‘voluntary	detention’	at	
home	as	a	means	of	avoiding	the	risk	of	arrest	and	detention.60	In	short,	the	visual	politics	of	
(in)visibility	consists	simultaneously	of	blending	in,	remaining	invisible	and	claiming	a	presence;	of	
inclusion	and	exclusion;	of	control	and	subversion.	
5.	(In)visibility	as	Politics	of	Knowledge		
The	second	sense	of	(in)visibility,	as	a	form	of	knowledge	production,	plays	out	paradoxically	in	
Malaysia.	The	UNHCR’s	efforts	of	‘making	visible’	by	producing	(governable)	refugee	subjectivities	
has	already	been	discussed.	What	is	remarkable	about	the	government’s	approach	is	the	lack	of	
interest	in	‘making	knowable’	in	this	sense.	Rather,	its	governance	consists	of	producing	the	category	
of	the	‘illegal	migrant’	to	cover	all	irregular	migrants	–	i.e.	it	governs	migration	through	its	
illegalisation.61	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	a	government	concerned	with	managing	the	population	
in	various	other	respects	allows	a	body	that	it	does	not	officially	recognise	to	pursue	and	create	far-
reaching	practices	of	governance	and	knowledge,	pursuing	the	mandate	of	a	UN	Convention	it	has	
not	signed.	Despite	the	government’s	general	stance	of	‘not	seeing’	refugees,	they	are	(allowed	to	
be)	made	visible	on	occasion,	especially	when	the	frame	of	visibility	in	international.	Two	recent	
examples	illustrate	this:	firstly,	US	president	Barack	Obama’s	visit	to	Malaysia;	and,	secondly,	the	
announcement	of	the	welcoming	of	Syrian	refugees.		
Whilst	in	Kuala	Lumpur	for	a	US-ASEAN	Summit	in	November	2015,	President	Obama	visited	a	
learning	centre	for	underprivileged	children,	some	of	who	are	‘refugees’.	He	also	met	‘refugee	
children’	who	are	preparing	to	be	resettled	to	the	US.	The	international	attention	to	these	children	as	
refugees	could	have	functioned	as	a	form	of	knowledge	production	visibilising	their	precarious	
situation,	however,	on	this	occasion	visibility	functioned	in	effect	to	invisibilise.	Not	only	was	there																																																									
58	Cf.	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia	(London	and	New	
York:	Continuum,	2004),	p.	262.	See	also:	Ansems	de	Vries,	‘Politics	of	Life’	
59	Nah,	‘Seeking	refuge’,	p.	149.		
60	Ibid.,	pp.	157-8.	
61	Scheel	and	Squire,	‘Forced	migrants’.	
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no	mention	of	the	Malaysian	government’s	failure	to	officially	acknowledge	refugees,	the	
government	was	praised	for	its	support	for	refugees.	During	his	visit	to	the	learning	centre,	Obama	
remarked:	‘I	want	to	acknowledge	the	Malaysian	government	for	its	efforts	to	welcome	and	support	
refugees	from	around	the	world.	Today,	Malaysia	hosts	some	150,000	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	
from	countries	as	varied	as	Sudan,	Somalia,	and	Myanmar.’62	Visibility	was	a	kind	of	trap,	albeit	in	a	
somewhat	different	sense	than	described	by	Foucault:	the	knowledge	or	truth	produced	–	as	the	
words	of	authority	of	the	US	president	–	rendered	invisible	the	criminalisation,	marginalisation	and	
violence	that	these	same	refugees	face	on	a	daily	basis.		
Obama’s	words	functioned	to	invisibilise	in	a	second	sense:	he	appeared	more	concerned	
about	the	domestic	debate	on	migration	in	the	US	than	that	in	Malaysia.	In	the	wake	of	the	13	
November	2015	Paris	Attacks,	Obama	sought	to	delink	the	“threats”	of	terrorism	and	refugees	by	
showing	how	innocent	and	unthreatening	refugee	children	are,	noting	that	‘they	represent	opposite	
of	terrorism	and	the	opposite	of	the	kind	of	despicable	violence	that	we	saw	in	Mali	and	in	Paris.’63	In	
this	respect,	Burmese	refugee	children	in	Malaysia	became	a	political	tool	to	press	for	the	
acceptance	of	more	Syrian	refugees	in	the	US;	they	became	invisible	as	refugee	children	in	the	
particular	Malaysian	context.	Moreover,	the	learning	centre	that	functioned	as	the	backdrop	to	the	
event,	which	schools	some	refugees	among	other	underprivileged	children,	looked	a	lot	better	
resourced	than	many	of	the	learning	centres	run	by	community	centres,	which	the	majority	of	
refugee	children	attend.	In	this	case,	visibility	invisibilises:	the	knowledge	created	through	an	official	
narrative	and	a	set	of	images	renders	other	realities	unseen.	This	might	appear	like	a	straightforward	
discourse	of	governance,	however,	it	is	enabled	by	acknowledging	and	utilising	the	“subversive”	
category	of	the	refugee.		
The	second	example	concerns	the	Malaysian	government’s	announcement	that	it	will	accept	
3000	Syrian	refugees	over	a	period	of	three	years.	Whilst	this	number	seems	trivial	in	comparison	to	
the	total	number	of	refugees	from	Syria	(4-5	million),	its	significance	lies	in	the	government’s	
recognition	of	these	migrants	as	refugees.	Announcing	the	plan	at	a	session	of	the	United	Nations	
General	Assembly	in	October	2015,	Prime	Minister	Najib	turned	it	into	an	opportunity	to	highlight																																																									
62	Barack	Obama,	‘Remarks	by	President	Obama	at	the	Dignity	for	Children	Foundation’,	The	White	House,	
Office	of	the	Press	Secretary,	available	at:	{https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/21/remarks-president-obama-dignity-children-foundation}	accessed	13	January	2016.	It	is	
worthwhile	to	note	that	this	account	was	not	challenged	during	a	press	conference	the	next	day.	See:	‘Press	
Conference	by	President	Obama’,	The	White	House,	Office	of	the	Press	Secretary,	available	at:	
{https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/22/remarks-president-obama-press-conference}	
accessed	13	January	2016.			
63	The	White	House,	‘Remarks	by	President	Obama	at	the	Dignity	for	Children	Foundation’.	See	also:	‘President	
Obama	Met	With	Young	Muslim	Refugees	And	It	Was	Absolutely	Heartwarming’,	Huffington	Post,	available	at:	
{http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-muslim-refugees_564ff9c9e4b0d4093a57f652}	accessed	at	13	
January	2016.		
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Malaysia’s	positive	track	record	of	welcoming	refugees.64	His	remarks	can	be	seen	as	a	practice	of	
visibility	that	invisibilises	along	the	lines	of	Obama’s	words,	however,	something	else	is	at	play	as	
well.	The	production	of	refugee	subjects	by	the	government	is	for	a	very	select	group	of	people	only,	
and	these	“genuine”	refugees	remain	distinct	from	other	people	registered	with	the	UNHCR.	It	is	not	
yet	clear	how	the	government	will	square	the	circle	of	creating	a	special	class	of	‘refugees’	whilst	not	
recognising	others	who	have	gained	refugee	status	on	the	basis	of	the	same	UNHCR	criteria.		
In	the	1990s,	when	Malaysia	admitted	a	group	of	‘refugees’	from	Bosnia,	they	were	officially	
referred	to	as	‘guests’.65	Whilst	the	government	admits	it	‘still	has	to	sort	out	specifics	about	their	
status,	accommodation	needs	and	ability	to	work’,	it	is	likely	that	the	‘guests’	will	receive	temporary	
residence	passes,	allowing	them	to	work,	until	their	UNHCR	identity	cards	are	ready.66	Moreover,	
unlike	other	children	with	UNHCR	identity	cards,	‘guest’	children	will	be	allowed	to	attend	state	
schools.	This	could	be	summarised	as	the	creation	of	a	special	class	of	refugees	not	referred	to	as	
refugees	and	treated	like	economic	migrants	(receiving	work	permits),	which	renders	the	situation	of	
others	acknowledged	as	refugees	by	the	UNHCR,	but	criminalised	by	the	government,	invisible.	The	
UNHCR’s	subversion	of	the	illegalisation	of	all	irregular	migrants	is	turned	against	itself	by	the	
government’s	practices	of	governance-resistance.		
A	different	way	of	conceptualising	these	practices	of	visibility	that	invisibilise	is	to	think	of	it	as	
a	matter	of	becoming	visible	as	some-thing/one	else.	This	was	already	touched	upon	in	relation	to	
UNHCR	school	uniforms	and	rucksacks,	which	showed	that	it	can	be	taken	up	as	a	form	of	
governance	as	well	as	resistance.	Tazzioli	and	Walters	make	this	point	with	respect	to	the	rescue	of	
migrants	in	the	Mediterranean	Sea:	‘Visibility,	conceived	as	a	set	of	practices	of	knowledge	that	
makes	some	things	and	subjects	exposable	and	apprehensible	and	that	at	the	same	time	lets	others	
as	unseen	or	unperceivable,	can	be	cunningly	replayed	by	subjects	precisely	starting	from	this	field	of	
produced	visibility	and	invisibility	and	on	their	reversibility.’67	Refugees	at	sea,	who	mostly	seek	to	
remain	undetected	on	their	journeys	towards	Europe,	re-appropriate	the	EU’s	migration	
management	preoccupation	with	making	visible-knowable-governable	through	a	form	of	‘tactical	
																																																								
64	Kate	Mayberry,	‘First-class	refugees:	Malaysia’s	two-tier	system’,	Aljazeera,	available	at:	
{http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/12/class-refugees-malaysia-tier-system-
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visibility’,	that	is	by	demanding	to	be	seen	and	to	be	rescued,	and	thereby	to	become	objects	not	of	
security	but	of	humanitarian	concern.68			
In	Malaysia,	practices	of	making	or	becoming	visible	as	some-thing/one	else,	play	out	in	daily	
life	through	governance-resistance,	both	visually	and	in	knowledge	terms.	For	instance,	by	visually	
showing	their	UNHCR	identity	cards	when	stopped	by	police	or	immigration	officials,	irregular	
migrants	seek	to	make	themselves	knowable	as	refugees	rather	than	criminals.	However,	this	
subversive	visibility,	or	indeed	‘thing-power’,	of	becoming	something	else	is	grounded	in	UNHCR	
governance	–	i.e.	in	becoming	governable	in	other	ways.	Yet,	having	become	visible	as	refugees,	one	
can	push	further	to	become	other	than	a	mere	object	of	care,	and	pursue	a	politics	of	‘self-help’	that	
breaks	the	bounds	of	UNHCR’s	definition	of	(acceptable)	refugeenness.		
Conclusion		
Irregular	migrants	in	Malaysia	find	themselves	continuously	at	risk	of	arrest,	detention,	
violence	and	abuse.	Whilst	those	who	have	been	granted	refugee	status	by	the	UNHCR	are	
somewhat	better	off,	their	lives	remain	precarious	as	they	are	equally	considered	‘illegal	migrants’	
under	Malaysian	law.	However,	the	criminalisation	and	securitisation	of	irregular	migrants	does	not	
leave	‘refugees’	as	victims	without	agency,	or	as	the	dangerous	Other	of	the	population.	Nor	is	it	
simply	the	case	that	the	intervention	of	an	international	humanitarian	organisation	offers	these	
victims	of	sovereign	violence	a	refuge.		
By	shifting	focus	from	“the	refugee”	as	a	pre-constituted	subject	to	the	question	of	how	
refugee	subjectivities	come	into	being,	the	article	has	illustrated	that	practices	of	management	and	
exclusion	are	intricately	tied	up	with	practices	of	resistance.	In	addition,	by	shifting	focus	from	the	
actors	involved	to	the	forces	at	play,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	presumption	of	binary	relations	–	
governance	versus	resistance,	state	versus	migrant,	visibility	versus	invisibility	–	fails	to	grasp	the	
complexities	and	relationalities	at	play.			
Inspired	by	Foucault’s	writings	on	power	and	resistance,	the	article	has	proposed	the	idea	of	a	
mobile	play	of	governance-resistance	through	which	refugee	subjectivities	emerge	and	are	
simultaneously	managed,	contested,	adopted	and	subverted.	It	is	not	only	that	governance	and	
resistance	are	continuously	‘turned	round’;	the	same	practices	function	as	governance	and	resistance	
simultaneously.	This	play	of	governance-resistance	is	also	a	play	of	(in)visibilities,	whereby	visibility	is	
either	a	matter	of	seeing	visually	and/or	of	becoming	knowable,	and	hence	governable.	Yet,	both	
visibility	and	invisibility	can	function	as	either	governance	or	resistance,	whilst	certain	practices	
constitute	visibility	and	invisibility	simultaneously.	For	instance,	claiming	a	presence	as	refugee	in																																																									
68	Ibid.		
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resistance	to	official	non-existence	also	means	becoming	visible	and	eligible	for	(UNHCR)	
governance;	and	this	is	simultaneously	a	form	of	protection	and	a	practice	of	management,	exclusion	
and	decollectivisation.	Due	to	the	informality	of	these	processes	–	and	the	contingency	of	protection	
–	irregular	migrants	pursue	various	other	strategies	of	becoming	or	remaining	(in)visible,	for	instance	
by	‘blending	in’	and	creating	alternative	social	and	educational	spaces,	both	visible	and	out	of	sight.		
It	could	be	said	that	migrants	with	refugee	status	claim	an	affirmative	subjectivity	both	in	
defiance	of	and	on	the	very	basis	of	formally	produced	illegality.	That	is	to	say,	the	possibility	of	a	
politics	of	(in)visibility	emerges	not	merely	despite	legal	non-existence	but	also	because	the	absence	
of	governmental	structures	for	the	management	of	refugees	at	the	national	level	allows	for	the	
creation	of	informal	socio-political	spaces	of	resistance,	even	if	these	are	mediated	through	other	
forms	of	governance.	To	speak	of	the	intricacy	of	governance-resistance	in	this	context	is	not	so	
much	a	claim	that	resistance	is	always	already	hijacked	or	co-opted	by	forms	of	regulation	and	
control.	Rather,	it	suggests	that	governance	can	also	feed	resistance,	and	become	productive	of	
affirmative	political	subjectivities,	in	the	sense	of	a	becoming	different	from	the	(governed)	refugee	
subject.	To	become	visible	and	knowable	is	not	necessarily	to	be	produced	either	as	criminal	or	as	
governable	subject,	but	can	also	materialise	as	becoming	some-thing/one	else	that	challenges	both	
these	categories.		
Thus,	the	mobility	and	contingency	of	these	processes	–	affirming	a	presence	in	official	
invisibility;	being	invisibilised	through	visibility,	or	vice	versa;	re-appropriating	the	visibility	of	being	
made	knowable;	etc.	–	means	that	refugee	subjectivities	can	be	strategic,	mobile,	emergent	and	
shifting,	and	produced,	managed	and	employed	in	various	ways	simultaneously.	In	this	dynamic	
politics	of	(in)visibility	refugees	come	into	being	and	become	other	from	the	notion	of	“the	refugee”	
understood	as	a	particular	type	of	subjectivity	characterised	by	a	lack	of	freedom	or	individuality.	
Something	comes	into	being	that	does	not	fit	pre-existing	categories:	modes	of	political	subjectivity	
that	are	mobile	and	shifting	as	well	as	intricately	tied	up	with	established	forms	of	framing	and	
categorisation,	whilst	simultaneously	disrupting	these.		
	
The	politics	of	(in)visibility	productive	and	disruptive	of	refugee	subjectivities	in	Malaysia	
consists	of	a	material-discursive	play	of	forces	that	encompasses	the	(il)legal,	the	(in)formal,	the	
(in)visible	and	everything	in-between.	It	features	not	merely	a	diversity	of	actors	–	government,	
UNHCR,	NGOs,	migrants,	community	organisations,	volunteers	–	but,	more	importantly,	a	
heterogeneous	set	of	‘things’,	practices,	forces	and	affects	of	governance-resistance	that	constitute	
the	play,	such	as:	night	raids;	the	fear	of	arrest;	detention;	community	centres	and	organisation;	the	
wait	for	and	politics	of	registration;	identity	cards,	and	their	acquirement	and	use;	the	claim	to	and	
prospect	of	resettlement;	(wearing	a)	UNHCR	uniform;	going	to	school;	more	of	less	formal	
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employment;	walking	around	the	city	(in)visibly;	not	“looking	like	a	foreigner”;	claiming	a	presence	as	
refugee;	being	invisibilised	through	visibility	and/or	becoming	visible	as	some-thing/one	else.	
	
	
	
	
